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TRACKING THE SLOWDOWN IN LONG-RUN GDP GROWTH
Juan Antolin-Diaz, Thomas Drechsel, and Ivan Petrella*
Abstract—Using a dynamic factor model that allows for changes in both
the long-run growth rate of output and the volatility of business cycles,
we document a significant decline in long-run output growth in the United
States. Our evidence supports the view that most of this slowdown occurred
prior to the Great Recession. We show how to use the model to decompose
changes in long-run growth into its underlying drivers. At low frequencies,
a decline in the growth rate of labor productivity appears to be behind
the recent slowdown in GDP growth for both the United States and other
advanced economies. When applied to real-time data, the proposed model
is capable of detecting shifts in long-run growth in a timely and reliable
manner.
I. Introduction
The global recovery has been disappointing. . . . Year
after year we have had to explain from mid-year on why
the global growth rate has been lower than predicted as
little as two quarters back.
Stanley Fischer, August 2014
THE slow pace of the recovery from the Great Recessionof 2007–2009 has prompted questions about whether
the long-run growth rate of GDP in advanced economies
is lower now than it has been on average over the past
decades (see, e.g., Fernald, 2014; Gordon, 2014b; Summers,
2014). Indeed, forecasts of U.S. and global real GDP growth
have been persistently too optimistic in the years after the
recession (2010–2015).1 As Orphanides (2003) emphasized,
real-time misperceptions about the long-run growth of the
economy can play a large role in monetary policy mistakes.
Moreover, small changes in assumptions about the long-run
growth rate of output can have large implications on fiscal
sustainability calculations (Auerbach, 2011). This calls for a
framework that takes the uncertainty about long-run growth
seriously and can inform decision making in real time. In this
paper, we present a dynamic factor model (DFM) that allows
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1 For instance, Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) projections
since 2009 expected U.S. growth to accelerate substantially, only to down-
grade the forecast back to 2% throughout the course of the subsequent year.
An analysis of forecasts produced by international organizations and pri-
vate sector economists reveals the same pattern. See Pain et al. (2014), for
a retrospective.
for gradual changes in the mean and the variance of real
output growth. By incorporating a broad panel of economic
activity indicators, DFMs are capable of precisely estimating
the cyclical comovement in macroeconomic data in a real-
time setting. Our model exploits this to track changes in the
long-run growth rate of real GDP in a timely and reliable
manner, separating them from their cyclical counterpart.2
The evidence of a decline in long-run U.S. growth is
accumulating, as documented by the recent growth literature
such as Fernald and Jones (2014). Lawrence Summers and
Robert Gordon have articulated a particularly pessimistic
view of long-run growth that contrasts with the optimism
prevailing before the Great Recession (see Jorgenson, Ho,
& Stiroh, 2006). To complement this evidence, we start our
analysis by presenting the results of two popular structural
break tests proposed by Nyblom (1989) and Bai and Perron
(1998). Both suggest that a possible shift in the mean of U.S.
real GDP growth exists, the latter approach suggesting that
a break probably occurred in the early part of the 2000s.
However, sequential testing using real-time data reveals that
the break would not have been detected at conventional sig-
nificance levels until as late as mid-2012, highlighting the
problems of conventional break tests for real-time analysis
(see also Benati, 2007). To address this issue, we introduce
two novel features into an otherwise standard DFM of real
activity data. First, we allow the mean of real GDP growth,
and possibly other series, to drift gradually over time. As
Cogley (2005) emphasized, if the long-run output growth
rate is not constant, it is optimal to give more weight to recent
data when estimating its current state. By taking a Bayesian
approach, we can combine our prior beliefs about the rate
at which the past information should be discounted with the
information contained in the data. We also characterize the
uncertainty around estimates of long-run growth, taking into
account both filtering and parameter uncertainty. Second, we
allow for stochastic volatility (SV) in the innovations to both
factors and idiosyncratic components. Given our interest in
studying the entire postwar period, the inclusion of SV is
essential to capture the substantial changes in the volatil-
ity of output that have taken place in this sample, such as
the “Great Moderation” first reported by Kim and Nelson
(1999a) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), as well as
the cyclicality of macroeconomic volatility as documented
by Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015).
When applied to U.S. data, our model concludes that long-
run GDP growth declined meaningfully during the 2000s
and currently stands at about 2%, more than 1 percent-
age point lower than the postwar average. The results are
2 Throughout this paper, our concept of the long run refers to changes
in growth that are permanent in nature, that is, do not mean-revert, as in
Beveridge and Nelson (1981). In practice, this should be thought of as
frequencies lower than the business cycle.
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supportive of a gradual decline rather than a discrete break.
Since in-sample results obtained with revised data often
underestimate the uncertainty that policymakers face in real
time, we repeat the exercise using real-time vintages of data.
The model detects the fall from the beginning of the 2000s
onward, and by the summer of 2010, it reaches the significant
conclusion that a decline in long-run growth is behind the
slow recovery, well before the structural break tests become
conclusive.
We also investigate the performance of the model in
“nowcasting” short-term developments in GDP. Since the
seminal contributions of Giannone, Reichlin, and Small
(2008) DFMs have become the standard tool for this purpose.
Interestingly, our analysis shows that standard DFM fore-
casts revert very quickly to the unconditional mean of GDP,
so taking into account the variation in long-run GDP growth
substantially improves point and density GDP forecasts even
at very short horizons.
Finally, we extend our model in order to disentangle
the drivers of secular fluctuations of GDP growth. Edge,
Laubach, and Williams (2007) emphasize the relevance as
well as the difficulty of tracking permanent shifts in pro-
ductivity growth in real time. In our framework, long-run
output growth can be decomposed into labor productivity
and labor input trends. The results of this decomposition
exercise point to a slowdown in labor productivity as the
main driver of recent weakness in GDP growth. Applying
the model to other advanced economies, we provide evi-
dence that the weakening in labor productivity appears to be
a global phenomenon.
Our work is closely related to two strands of literature.
The first one encompasses papers that allow for structural
changes within the DFM framework. Del Negro and Otrok
(2008) model time variation in factor loadings and volatil-
ities, while Marcellino, Porqueddu, and Venditti (2016)
show that the addition of SV improves the performance
of the model for short-term forecasting of euro-area GDP.
Acknowledging the importance of allowing for time varia-
tion in the means of the variables, Stock and Watson (2012)
prefilter their data set in order to remove any low-frequency
trends from the resulting growth rates using a biweight local
mean. In his comment to their paper, Sims (2012) suggests
explicitly modelling, rather than filtering out, these long-run
trends, and emphasizes the importance of evolving volatili-
ties for describing and understanding macroeconomic data.
We see our paper as extending the DFM literature and, in
particular, its application to tracking GDP, in the direction
suggested by Chris Sims. The second strand of related litera-
ture takes a similar approach to decomposing long-run GDP
growth into its drivers, in particular Gordon (2010, 2014a)
and Reifschneider, Wescher, and Wilcox (2013). Relative
to these studies, we emphasize the importance of using a
broader information set, as well as a Bayesian approach,
which allows using priors to inform the estimate of long-run
growth and characterize the uncertainty around the estimate
stemming from both filtering and parameter uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents preliminary evidence of a slowdown
in long-run U.S. GDP growth. Section III discusses the
implications of time-varying long-run output growth and
volatility for DFMs and presents our model. Section IV
applies the model to U.S. data and documents the decline
in long-run growth. The implications for tracking GDP in
real time, as well as the key advantages of our methodol-
ogy, are discussed. Section V decomposes the changes in
long-run output growth into its underlying drivers. Section
VI concludes.
II. Preliminary Evidence
The literature on economic growth favors a view of the
long-run growth rate as a process that evolves over time. It is
by now widely accepted that a slowdown in productivity and
long-run output growth occurred in the early 1970s, and that
accelerating productivity in the IT sector led to a boom in the
late 1990s. In contrast, in the context of econometric mod-
eling, the possibility that long-run growth is time varying
is the source of a long-standing controversy. In their semi-
nal contribution, Nelson and Plosser (1982) model the (log)
level of real GDP as a random walk with drift. This implies
that after first-differencing, the resulting growth rate fluctu-
ates around a constant mean, an assumption still embedded
in many econometric models. After the slowdown in pro-
ductivity became apparent in the 1970s, many researchers
such as Clark (1987) modeled the drift term as an additional
random walk, implying that the level of GDP is integrated
of order two. The latter assumption would also be consis-
tent with the local linear trend model of Harvey (1985), the
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter, and Stock and Watson’s
(2012) practice of removing a local biweight mean from the
growth rates before estimating a DFM. The I(2) assumption
is nevertheless controversial since it implies that the growth
rate of output can drift without bound. Consequently, papers
such as Perron and Wada (2009) have modeled the growth
rate of GDP as stationary around a trend with one large break
around 1973.
Ever since the Great Recession of 2007–2009, US real
GDP has grown well below its postwar average, once again
raising the question whether its mean may have declined.
There are two popular strategies that could be followed
from a frequentist perspective to detect parameter instabil-
ity or the presence of breaks in the mean growth rate. The
first one is Nyblom’s (1989) L-test, as described in Hansen
(1992), which tests the null hypothesis of constant param-
eters against the alternative that the parameters follow a
martingale. Modeling real GDP growth as an AR(1) over
the sample 1947–2015, this test rejects the stability of the
constant term at the 10% significance level.3 The second
3 The same result holds for an AR(2) specification. In both cases, the
stability of the autoregressive coefficients cannot be rejected, whereas the
stability of the variance is rejected at the 1% level. Section B of the online
appendix provides the full results of both tests applied in this section.
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commonly used approach, which can determine the num-
ber and timing of multiple discrete breaks, is the Bai and
Perron (1998) test. This test finds evidence in favor of a sin-
gle break in the mean of U.S. real GDP growth at the 10%
level. The most likely break date is in the second quarter of
2000. In related research, Fernald (2014) provides evidence
for breaks in labor productivity in 1973:Q2, 1995:Q3, and
2003:Q1 and links the latter two to developments in the IT
sector. From a Bayesian perspective, Luo and Startz (2014)
calculate the posterior probability of a single break and find
the most likely break date to be 2006:Q1 for the full postwar
sample and 1973:Q1 for a sample excluding the 2000s.
These results indicate that substantial evidence for a recent
change in the mean of U.S. GDP growth has built up.
However, the strategy of applying conventional tests and
introducing deterministic breaks into econometric models is
not satisfactory for the purposes of real-time decision mak-
ing. In fact, the detection of change in the mean of GDP
growth can arrive with substantial delay. To demonstrate
this, a sequential application of the Nyblom (1989) and Bai
and Perron (1998) tests using real-time data is presented
in figure 1. The evolution of the test statistics in real time
reveals that a break would not have been detected at the 10%
significance levels until as late as mid-2012, more than ten
years later than the actual break date suggested by Bai and
Perron’s (1998) procedure. The Nyblom (1989) test, which
is designed to detect gradual change rather than a discrete
break, becomes significant at roughly the same time. This
lack of timeliness highlights the importance of an econo-
metric framework capable of quickly adapting to changes in
long-run growth as new information arrives.
III. Econometric Framework
DFMs in the spirit of Sargent and Sims (1977) and Forni
et al. (2009) capture the idea that a small number of unob-
served factors drives the comovement of a possibly large
number of macroeconomic time series, each of which may
be contaminated by measurement error or other sources of
idiosyncratic variation. Their theoretical appeal, as well as
their ability to parsimoniously model large data sets, have
made them a workhorse of empirical macroeconomics. Gian-
none et al. (2008) have pioneered the use of DFMs to produce
current-quarter forecasts (“nowcasts”) of GDP growth by
exploiting more timely monthly indicators and the factor
structure of the data. Given the widespread use of DFMs to
track GDP in real time, this paper aims to make these models
robust to changes in long-run growth. We do so by introduc-
ing two novel features into the DFM framework. First, we
allow the long-run growth rate of real GDP, and possibly
other series, to vary over time. Second, we allow for sto-
chastic volatility (SV) in the innovations to both factors and
idiosyncratic components, given our interest in studying the
entire postwar period for which drastic changes in volatil-
ity have been documented. With these changes, the DFM
proves to be a powerful tool to detect changes in long-run
Figure 1.—Real-Time Test Statistics of the Nyblom and
Bai-Perron Tests
The gray and black solid lines are the values of the test statistics obtained from sequentially reapplying
the Nyblom (1989) and Bai and Perron (1998) tests in real time as new National Accounts vintages are being
published. In both cases, the sample starts in 1947:Q2, and the test is reapplied for every new data release
occurring after the beginning of 2000. The dotted and dashed horizontal lines represent, respectively, the
5% and 10% critical values corresponding to the two tests.
growth. The information contained in a broad panel of activ-
ity indicators facilitates the timely decomposition of real
GDP growth into persistent long-run movements, cyclical
fluctuations, and short-lived noise.
A. The Model
Let yt be an n × 1 vector of observable macroeconomic
time series, and let ft denote a k × 1 vector of latent com-
mon factors. It is assumed that n >> k (i.e., the number
of observables is much larger than the number of factors).
Formally,
yt = ct +Λft + ut , (1)
where Λ contains the loadings on the common factors and
ut is a vector of idiosyncratic components.4 Shifts in the
long-run mean of yt are captured by time variation in ct .
In principle, one could allow time-varying intercepts in all
or a subset of the variables in the system. Moreover, time
variation in a given series could be shared by other series. ct
is therefore flexibly specified as
ct =
[
B 0
0 c
][
at
1
]
, (2)
where at is an r × 1 vector of time-varying means, B is an
m × r matrix that governs how the time variation affects the
corresponding observables, and c is an (n − m) × 1 vector
of constants. In our baseline specification, at will be a scalar
capturing time variation in long-run real GDP growth, which
is shared by real consumption growth, so that r = 1, m = 2.
4 The model can be easily extended to include lags of the factor in the
measurement equation (see appendix J).
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A detailed discussion of this and additional specifications of
ct is be provided in section IIIB.
Throughout the paper, we focus on the case of a single
dynamic factor by setting k = 1 (i.e., ft = ft).5 The laws of
motion of the latent factor and the idiosyncratic components
are
(1 − φ(L))ft = σεt εt , (3)
(1 − ρi(L))ui,t = σηi,tηi,t , i = 1, . . . , n, (4)
where φ(L) and ρi(L) denote polynomials in the lag operator
of order p and q, respectively. The idiosyncratic compo-
nents are cross-sectionally orthogonal and are assumed to be
uncorrelated with the common factor at all leads and lags:
εt
iid∼ N(0, 1) and ηi,t iid∼ N(0, 1).
Finally, the dynamics of the model’s time-varying
parameters are specified to follow driftless random walks,
aj,t = aj,t−1 + vaj,t , vaj,t iid∼ N(0,ω2a,j) j = 1, . . . , r,
(5)
log σεt = log σεt−1 + vε,t , vε,t
iid∼ N(0,ω2ε ), (6)
log σηi,t = log σηi,t−1 + vηi,t , vηi,t
iid∼ N(0,ω2η,i)
i = 1, . . . , n, (7)
where aj,t are the r time-varying elements in at and σεt
and σηi,t capture the SV of the innovations to factor and
idiosyncratic components. Our motivation for specifying the
time-varying parameters as random walks is similar to Primi-
ceri (2005). While in principle it is unrealistic to model real
GDP growth as a process that could wander in an unbounded
way, as long as the variance of the process is small and the
drift is considered to be operating for a finite period of time,
the assumption is innocuous. Moreover, modeling a trend as
a random walk is more robust to misspecification when the
actual process is instead characterized by discrete breaks,
whereas models with discrete breaks might not be robust to
the true process being a random walk.6 Finally, the random
walk assumption also has the desirable feature that, unlike
stationary models, confidence bands around forecasts of real
GDP growth increase with the forecast horizon, reflecting
uncertainty about the possibility of future breaks or drifts in
long-run growth.
Note that a standard DFM is usually specified under two
assumptions. First, the original data have been differenced
5 For the purpose of tracking real GDP with a large number of closely
related activity indicators, the use of one factor is appropriate. Also note
that we order real GDP growth as the first element of yt and normalize the
loading for GDP to unity. This serves as an identifying restriction in our
estimation algorithm. Bai and Wang (2015) discuss minimal identifying
assumptions for DFMs.
6 We demonstrate this point with the use of Monte Carlo simulations,
showing that a random walk trend in real GDP growth learns quickly about
a discrete break once it has occurred. However, the random walk does not
detect a drift when there is not one, despite the presence of a large cyclical
component. Online appendix C provides a discussion and the full results of
these simulations.
appropriately so that both the factor and the idiosyncratic
components can be assumed to be stationary. Second, it is
assumed that the innovations in the idiosyncratic and com-
mon components are i.i.d. In equations 1 to 7 we have relaxed
these assumptions to allow for two novel features: a stochas-
tic trend in the mean of selected series and SV. By shutting
down these features, we can recover the specifications pre-
viously proposed in the literature, which are nested in our
framework. We obtain the DFM with SV of Marcellino et al.
(2016) if we shut down time variation in the intercepts of the
observables, that is, set r = m = 0 and ct = c. If we further
shut down the SV, that is, set ω2a,j = ω2 = ω2η,i = 0, we
obtain the specification of Banbura, Giannone, and Reichlin
(2010) and Banbura and Modugno (2014).
B. A Baseline Specification for Long-Run Growth
Equations (1) and (2) allow for stochastic trends in the
mean of all or a subset of selected observables in yt . This
paper focuses on tracking changes in the long-run growth
rate of real GDP. For this purpose, the simplest specifica-
tion of ct is to include a time-varying intercept only in GDP
and to set B = 1. However, a number of empirical studies
(e.g., Cochrane, 1994; Cogley, 2005) argue that incorporat-
ing information about consumption is informative about the
permanent component in GDP as predicted by the perma-
nent income hypothesis. The theory predicts that consumers,
smoothing consumption throughout their lifetime, should
react more strongly to permanent, as opposed to transitory,
changes in income. As a consequence, looking at GDP and
consumption data together will help in separating growth
into long-run and cyclical fluctuations.7 Therefore, our base-
line specification imposes that consumption and output grow
at the same rate gt in the long run. On the contrary, we do
not impose that investment also grows at this rate, as would
be the case in the basic neoclassical growth model, since
the presence of investment-specific technological change
implies that real investment has a different low-frequency
trend (Greenwood, Hercowitz, & Krussel, 1997).
Formally, ordering real GDP and consumption growth
first, and setting m = 2 and r = 1, this is represented as
at = gt , B = [1 1]′. (8)
Note that in this baseline specification, we model time
variation only in the intercept for GDP and consumption
while leaving it constant for the other observables. Of course,
it may be the case that some of the remaining n − m series
in yt feature low-frequency variation in their means. For
instance, this could be the case for investment. The key
question is whether leaving it unspecified will affect the esti-
mate of the long-run growth rate of GDP, our main object
7 While a strict interpretation of the permanent income hypothesis is
rejected in the data, from an econometric point of view, the statement applies
as long as permanent changes are the main driver of consumption. See
Cochrane (1994) for a very similar discussion.
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of interest. We ensure that this is not the case by allow-
ing for persistence (and, in particular, we do not rule out
unit roots) in the idiosyncratic components. If a series does
feature a unit root that is not included in at , its trend compo-
nent will be absorbed by the idiosyncratic component. The
choice of which elements to include in at therefore reflects
the focus of a particular application.8 Of course, if two series
share the same underlying low-frequency component and
this is known with certainty, explicitly accounting for the
shared low-frequency variation will improve the precision
of the estimation, but the risk of incorrectly including the
trend is much larger than the risk of incorrectly excluding it.
Therefore, in our baseline specification we include in at the
intercept for GDP and consumption, while leaving any pos-
sible low-frequency variation in other series to be captured
by the respective idiosyncratic components.9
An extension to include additional time-varying intercepts
is straightforward through the flexible construction of ct in
equation (2). In fact, in section V, we explore how interest
in the low-frequency movements of additional series leads
to alternative choices for at and B.10
C. Dealing with Mixed Frequencies and Missing Data
Tracking activity in real time requires a model that can
efficiently incorporate information from series measured at
different frequencies. In particular, it must include both quar-
terly variables, such as the growth rate of real GDP, as well as
more timely monthly indicators of real activity. Therefore,
the model is specified at monthly frequency, and follow-
ing Mariano and Murasawa (2003), the (observed) quarterly
growth rates of a generic quarterly variable, xqt , can be related
to the (unobserved) monthly growth rate xmt and its lags using
a weighted mean. Specifically,
x
q
t = 13x
m
t +
2
3
xmt−1 + xmt−2 +
2
3
xmt−3 +
1
3
xmt−4, (9)
8 In principle, these unmodeled trends could still be recovered from our
specification by applying a Beveridge-Nelson decomposition to its esti-
mated idiosyncratic component. In practice, any low-frequency variation in
the idiosyncratic component is likely to be obscured by a large amount of
high-frequency noise in the data, and as result, the extracted Beveridge-
Nelson trend component will be imprecisely estimated and will not be
smooth. In our specification, the elements of at are instead extracted directly,
so that we are able to improve the extraction by imposing additional
assumptions (e.g., smoothness) and prior beliefs (e.g., low variability) on
its properties.
9 We confirm this line of reasoning with a series of Monte Carlo experi-
ments in which data are generated from a system that features low-frequency
movements in more series, which are left unmodeled in the estimation. In
both the case of series with independent trends and series that share the
trend of interest, the fact that they are left unmodeled has little impact on
the estimate of the latter. Online appendix C presents further discussion and
the full results of these simulations.
10 Note that the limiting case explicitly models time-varying intercept in
all indicators, so that m = r = n and B = In, that is, an identity matrix
of dimension n. See Creal, Koopman, and Zivot (2010) and Fleischman
and Roberts (2011) for similar approaches. This setup would imply that
the number of state variables increases with the number of observables,
which severely increases the computational burden of the estimation while
offering little additional evidence with respect to the focus of this paper.
and only every third observation of xqt is actually observed.
Substituting the corresponding line of equation (1) into
equation (9) yields a representation in which the quarterly
variable depends on the factor and its lags. The presence of
mixed frequencies is thus reduced to a problem of missing
data in a monthly model.
Besides mixed frequencies, additional sources of missing
data in the panel include the “ragged edge” at the end of
the sample, which stems from the nonsynchronicity of data
releases; missing data at the beginning of the sample, since
some data series have been created or collected more recently
than others; and missing observations due to outliers and data
collection errors. Our Bayesian estimation method exploits
the state-space representation of the DFM and jointly esti-
mates the latent factors, the parameters, and the missing data
points using the Kalman filter.
D. State-Space Representation and Estimation
The model features autocorrelated idiosyncratic compo-
nents (see equation [4]). In order to cast it in state-space
form, we include the idiosyncratic components of the quar-
terly variables in the state vector, and we redefine the system
for the monthly indicators in terms of quasi-differences
(see, e.g., Kim & Nelson, 1999b).11 The model is estimated
with Bayesian methods simulating the posterior distribu-
tion of parameters and factors using a Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. We closely follow the Gibbs-
sampling algorithm for DFMs proposed by Bai and Wang
(2015) but extend it to include mixed frequencies, the time-
varying intercept, and SV. The SVs are sampled using the
approximation of Kim, Shephard, and Chib (1998), which is
considerably faster than the exact Metropolis-Hastings algo-
rithm of Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (2002). Our complete
sampling algorithm, together with the details of the state-
space representation, can be found in section D of the online
appendix.
IV. Results for U.S. Data
A. Data Selection
Our data set includes four key business cycle vari-
ables measured at quarterly frequency (output, consumption,
investment, and aggregate hours worked), as well as a set of
24 monthly indicators that are intended to provide additional
information about cyclical developments in a timely manner.
The included quarterly variables are strongly procycli-
cal and are considered key indicators of the business cycle
11 Since the quarterly variables are observed only every third month, we
cannot take the quasi-difference for their idiosyncratic components, which
are instead added as an additional state with the corresponding transi-
tion dynamics. Banbura and Modugno (2014) suggest including all of the
idiosyncratic components as additional elements of the state vector. Our
solution has the desirable feature that the number of state variables will
increase with the number of quarterly variables rather than the total number
of variables leading to a gain of computational efficiency.
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(see, e.g., Stock & Watson, 1999). Furthermore, theory pre-
dicts that they will be useful in disentangling low-frequency
movements from cyclical fluctuations in output growth.
Indeed, as discussed in section IIIB, the permanent income
hypothesis predicts that consumption data will be partic-
ularly useful for the estimation of the long-run growth
component, gt .12 However, investment and hours worked are
very sensitive to cyclical fluctuations and thus will be partic-
ularly informative for the estimation of the common factor,
ft .13
The additional monthly indicators are crucial to our objec-
tive of disentangling in real time the cyclical and long-run
components of GDP growth, since the quarterly variables
are only available with substantial delay. In principle, a
large number of candidate series are available to inform
the estimate of ft , and indirectly, of gt . In practice, how-
ever, macroeconomic data series are typically clustered in
a small number of broad categories (such as production,
employment, or income) for which disaggregated series are
available along various dimensions (such as economic sec-
tors, demographic characteristics, or expenditure categories).
The choice of which available series to include for estima-
tion can therefore be broken into, first, a choice of which
broad categories to include, and second, to which level and
along which dimensions of disaggregation.
With regard to which broad categories of data to include,
previous studies agree that prices and monetary and financial
indicators are uninformative for the purpose of tracking real
GDP, and argue for extracting a single common factor that
captures real economic activity.14 As for the possible inclu-
sion of disaggregated series within each category, Boivin and
Ng (2006) argue that the presence of strong correlation in
the idiosyncratic components of disaggregated series of the
same category will be a source of misspecification that can
worsen the performance of the model in terms of in-sample
fit and out-of-sample forecasting of key series.15 Alvarez
et al. (2012) investigate the trade-off between DFMs with
very few indicators, where the good large-sample proper-
ties of factor models are unlikely to hold, and those with a
very large amount of indicators, where the problems above
12 Due to the presence of faster technological change in the durable goods
sector, there is a downward trend in the relative price of durable goods.
As a consequence, measured consumption grows faster than overall GDP.
Following a long tradition in the literature (see, e.g., Whelan, 2003), we
construct a Fisher index of nondurables and services and use its growth rate
as an observable variable in the panel. It can be verified that the ratio of
consumption defined in this manner to real GDP displays no trend in the
data, unlike the trend observed in the ratio of overall consumption to GDP.
13 We define investment as a chain-linked aggregate of business fixed
investment and consumption of durable goods, which is consistent with
our treatment of consumption. In order to obtain a measure of hours for the
total economy we follow the methodology of Ohanian and Raffo (2012).
14 Giannone et al. (2005) conclude that that prices and monetary indicators
do not contribute to the precision of GDP nowcasts. Forni et al. (2003) and
Stock and Watson (2003) find at best mixed results for financial variables.
15 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that more detailed disaggrega-
tion levels and dimensions are available for certain categories of data, such
as employment, meaning that the disaggregation will automatically tilt the
factor estimates toward that category.
are likely to arise. They conclude that using a medium-sized
panel with representative indicators of each category yields
the best forecasting results.
The above considerations lead us to select 24 monthly
indicators that include the high-level aggregates for all of the
available broad categories that capture real activity, without
overweighting any particular category. The complete list of
variables contained in our data set is presented in table 1. As
the table shows, we include representative series of expen-
diture and income, the labor market, production and sales,
foreign trade, housing, and business and consumer confi-
dence.16 The inclusion of all the available monthly surveys
is particularly important. Apart from being the most timely
series available, these are unlikely to feature permanent shifts
in their mean by construction and have a high signal-to-noise
ratio. They thus provide a clean signal to separate the cycli-
cal component of GDP growth from its long-run counterpart.
In section IVF, we explore the sensitivity of our results to
the size and composition of the data panel used.
Our panel spans the period January 1947 to March 2015.
The start of our sample coincides with the year for which
quarterly national accounts data are available from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. This enables us to study
the evolution of long-run growth over the entire postwar
period.17
B. Model Settings and Priors
The choice of the data set justifies the single-factor struc-
ture of the model. ft in this case can be interpreted as a
coincident indicator of real economic activity (see, e.g.,
Stock & Watson, 1989, and Mariano & Murasawa, 2003).
The number of lags in the polynomials φ(L) and ρ(L) is
set to p = 2 and q = 2 as in Stock and Watson (1989).
We wish to impose as little prior information as possible,
so we use uninformative priors for the factor loadings and
the autoregressive coefficients of factors and idiosyncratic
components. The variances of the innovations to the time-
varying parameters, ω2a, ω2ε , and ω2η,i in equations (5) to
(7), are, however, difficult to identify from the informa-
tion contained in the likelihood alone. As the literature on
Bayesian VARs documents, attempts to use noninformative
priors for these parameters will in many cases produce poste-
rior estimates, which imply a relatively large amount of time
variation. While this will tend to improve the in-sample fit
16 When there are multiple candidates for the high-level aggregate of a cat-
egory, we include both. For example, we include employment as measured
by both the establishment and household surveys, and consumer confidence
as surveyed by both the Conference Board and the University of Michigan.
17 We take full advantage of the Kalman filter’s ability to deal with missing
observations at any point in the sample, and we are able to incorporate series
that become available substantially later than 1947, up to as late as 2007.
Note that for consumption expenditures, monthly data became available
in 1959, whereas quarterly data are available from 1947. In order to use
all available data, we apply the polynomial in equation (9) to the monthly
data and treat the series as quarterly, with available observations for the last
month of the quarter for 1947 to 1958 and for all months since 1959.
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Table 1.—Data Series Used in Empirical Analysis
Type Start Date Transform. Lag
Quarterly time series
Real GDP Expenditure and income Q2:1947 % QoQ Ann 26
Real consumption (excl. durables) Expenditure and income Q2:1947 % QoQ Ann 26
Real investment (incl. durable consumption) Expenditure and income Q2:1947 % QoQ Ann 26
Total hours worked Labor Market Q2:1948 % QoQ Ann 28
Monthly indicators
Real personal income less transfers Expenditure and income Feb 59 % MoM 27
Industrial production Production and sales Jan 47 % MoM 15
New orders of capital goods Production and sales Mar 68 % MoM 25
Real retail sales and food services Production and sales Feb 47 % MoM 15
Lightweight vehicle sales Production and sales Feb 67 % MoM 1
Real exports of goods Foreign trade Feb 68 % MoM 35
Real imports of goods Foreign trade Feb 69 % MoM 35
Building permits Housing Feb 60 % MoM 19
Housing starts Housing Feb 59 % MoM 26
New home sales Housing Feb 63 % MoM 26
Payroll empl. (Establishment Survey) Labor market Jan 47 % MoM 5
Civilian empl. (Household Survey) Labor market Feb 48 % MoM 5
Unemployed Labor market Feb 48 % MoM 5
Initial claims for unemployment insurance Labor market Feb 48 % MoM 4
Monthly indicators (soft)
Markit Manufacturing PMI Business confidence May 07 - −7
ISM manufacturing PMI Business confidence Jan 48 - 1
ISM nonmanufacturing PMI Business confidence Jul 97 - 3
NFIB Small Business Optimism Index Business confidence Oct 75 Diff 12 M. 15
U. of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment Consumer confidence May 60 Diff 12 M. −15
Conference Board: Consumer Confidence Consumer confidence Feb 68 Diff 12 M. −5
Empire State Manufacturing Survey Business (regional) Jul 01 - −15
Richmond Fed Mfg Survey Business (regional) Nov 93 - −5
Chicago PMI Business (regional) Feb 67 - 0
Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Business (regional) May 68 - 0
% QoQ Ann refers to the quarter-on-quarter annualized growth rate, % MoM refers to (yt − yt−1)/yt−1, and Diff 12 M. refers to yt − yt−12. The last column shows the average publication lag: the number of days
elapsed from the end of the period that the data point refers to until its publication by the statistical agency. All series were obtained from the Haver Analytics database.
of the model, it is also likely to worsen out-of-sample fore-
cast performance. We therefore use priors to shrink these
variances toward 0—toward the standard DFM that excludes
time-varying long-run GDP growth and SV. In particular, for
ω2a, we set an inverse gamma prior with 1 degree of freedom
and scale equal to 0.001.18 For ω2 and ω2η,i we set an inverse
gamma prior with 1 degree of freedom and scale equal to
0.0001, closely following Cogley and Sargent (2005) and
Primiceri (2005).19 We estimate the model with 7,000 repli-
cations of the Gibbs-sampling algorithm, of which the first
2,000 are discarded as burn-in draws and the remaining ones
are kept for inference.
C. In-Sample Results
Figure 2a plots the posterior median, together with the
68% and 90% posterior credible intervals of the long-run
growth rate of real GDP. This estimate is conditional on the
entire sample and accounts for both filtering and parame-
ter uncertainty. Several features of our estimate of long-run
growth are worth noting. While the growth rate is stable
18 To gain an intuition about this prior, note that over a period of ten years,
this would imply that the random walk process of the long-run growth rate is
expected to vary with a standard deviation of around 0.4 percentage points
in annualized terms, a fairly conservative prior.
19 We provide further explanations and address robustness to the choice
of priors in online appendix F.
between 3% and 4% during the first decades of the post-
war period, a slowdown is clearly visible from around the
late 1960s through the 1970s, consistent with the “produc-
tivity slowdown” (Nordhaus, 2004). The acceleration of the
late 1990s and early 2000s associated with the productivity
boom in the IT sector (Oliner & Sichel, 2000) is also visible.
Thus, until the middle of the first decade of the 2000s, our
estimate conforms well to the generally accepted narrative
about fluctuations in potential growth.20 More recently, after
peaking at about 3.5% in 2000, the median estimate of the
long-run growth rate has fallen to about 2% in early 2015,
a more substantial decline than the one observed after the
productivity slowdown of the 1970s. Moreover, the slow-
down appears to have happened gradually since the start of
the 2000s, with most of the decline having occurred before
the Great Recession.21 Interestingly, a small rebound is vis-
ible at the end of the sample, but long-run growth stands far
20 Online appendix G provides a comparison of our estimate with the Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) measure of potential growth, with some
additional discussion.
21 In principle, it is possible that our choice of modeling long-run GDP
growth as a random walk is hard-wiring into our conclusion that the decline
happened in a gradual way. In experiments with simulated data, presented
in section C of the online appendix, we show that if changes in long-run
growth occur in the form of discrete breaks rather than evolving gradually,
the (one-sided) filtered estimates will exhibit a discrete jump at the moment
of the break. Instead, for U.S. data, the filtered estimates of the long-run
growth component also decline in a gradual manner (see figure A.1 in online
appendix A).
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Figure 2.—Trend, Cycle, and Volatility, 1947–2015 (%Annual
Growth Rate)
(a) Posterior Estimate of Long-Run Growth
(b) Posterior Estimate of Common Factor versus Actual GDP Growth
(c) Posterior Estimate of Common Factor Volatility
(a) The posterior median (solid line), together with the 68% and 90% (dotted and dashed lines) posterior
credible intervals of long-run real GDP growth. (b) Actual real GDP growth (thin line) against the posterior
median estimate of the common factor, aligned with the mean of real GDP growth (thick line). (c) The
median (solid line) and the 68% and the 90% (dotted and dashed lines) posterior credible intervals of the
volatility of the common factor, that is, the square root of var(ft ) = σ2ε,t (1−φ2)/[(1+φ2)((1−φ2)2 −φ21)].
Shaded areas represent NBER recessions.
below its postwar average of 3.2%, with the 90% posterior
credible interval ranging from 1.5% to 2.5%.
Figure 2b plots the time series of quarterly real GDP
growth, together with the median posterior estimates of the
common factor, aligned with the mean of real GDP growth.
This plot highlights how the common factor captures the
bulk of business cycle frequency variation in output growth,
while higher-frequency, quarter-to-quarter variation is attrib-
uted to the idiosyncratic component. In the latter part of the
sample, GDP growth is visibly below the factor, reflecting
the decline in long-run growth.
The posterior estimate of the SV of the common factor
is presented in figure 2c. It is clearly visible that volatility
declines over the sample. The late 1940s and 1950s were
extremely volatile, with a first large drop in volatility in the
early 1960s. The Great Moderation is also clearly visible,
with the average volatility pre-1985 being much larger than
the average of the post-1985 sample. Notwithstanding the
large increase in volatility during the Great Recession, our
estimate of the common factor volatility since then remains
consistent with the Great Moderation still being in place.
This confirms the early evidence reported by Gadea-Rivas,
Gomez-Loscos, and Perez-Quiros (2014). It is clear from
the figure that volatility spikes during recessions, a fea-
ture that brings our estimates close to the recent findings of
Jurado et al. (2015) relating to business cycle uncertainty.22 It
appears that the random walk specification is flexible enough
to capture cyclical changes in volatility as well as permanent
phenomena such as the Great Moderation. Online appen-
dix A contains analogous charts for the volatilities of the
idiosyncratic components of selected data series. Similar to
the volatility of the common factor, many of the idiosyncratic
volatilities present sharp increases during recessions.
The results provide evidence that a significant decline
in long-run U.S. real GDP growth occurred over the past
decade and are consistent with a relatively gradual decline
since the early 2000s. Our estimates show that the bulk of
the slowdown from the elevated levels of growth at the turn
of the century occurred before the Great Recession, which
is consistent with the narrative of Fernald (2014) on the
fading of the IT productivity boom. This recent decline is
the largest movement in long-run growth observed in the
postwar period.
D. Real-Time Results
As Orphanides (2003) emphasized, macroeconomic time
series are heavily revised over time, and in many cases these
revisions contain valuable information that was not available
at initial release. Therefore, it is important to assess, using
the data available at each point in time, when the model
detected the slowdown in long-run growth. For this purpose,
we reconstruct our data set using vintages of data avail-
able from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ALFRED
database. Our aim is to replicate as closely as possible the
situation of a decision maker who would have applied our
model in real time. We fix the start of our sample in 1947:Q1
and use an expanding out-of-sample window that starts on
January 11, 2000, and ends on June 30, 2015. This is the
longest possible window for which we are able to include
the entire panel in table 1 using fully real-time data. We then
proceed by reestimating the model each day in which new
data are released.23
22 It is interesting to note that while in our model the innovations to the
level of the common factor and its volatility are uncorrelated, the fact that
increases in volatility are observed during recessions indicates the presence
of negative correlation between the first and second moments, implying
negative skewness in the distribution of the common factor. We believe
a more explicit model of this feature is an important priority for future
research.
23 In a few cases, new indicators were developed after January 2000. For
example, the Markit Manufacturing PMI survey is currently one of the
most timely and widely followed indicators, but it started being conducted
in 2007. In those cases, we append to the panel, in real time, the vintages
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Figure 3.—Long-Run GDP Growth Estimates in Real Time
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Vintages of long-run growth estimates Real-time estimate of current long-run growth Latest estimate
(a) Evolution of the Current Assessment of Long-Run Growth
(b) Selected Vintages of Long-Run Growth Estimates
      Using Real-Time Data
The figure presents results from reestimating the model using the vintage of data available at each point
in time from January 2000 to March 2015. The start of the estimation sample is fixed at Q1:1947. (a) The
median real-time estimate of current long-run growth over time. This is the locus traced by the end points
of all vintages. The shaded areas around the solid line represent the 68th and 90th percentiles. The dashed
line is the contemporaneous estimate of the historical average of real GDP growth. The diamonds are the
median response to the Philadelphia Fed Livingston Survey of Professional Forecasters on the average
growth rate for the next 10 years. (b) The median estimate of long-run GDP growth for various vintages
of data (dashed gray lines). The estimate of the latest vintage is shown as the solid thick line. Gray shaded
areas represent NBER recessions in both panels.
Figure 3 looks at the model’s real-time assessment of
long-run growth at various points in time. Figure 3a plots
the real-time estimate of current long-run growth, with 68%
and 90% uncertainty bands. For comparison, the panel also
shows the median response to the Philadelphia Fed Liv-
ingston Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) on the
average growth rate for the next ten years and the estimate
of long-run growth from a model with a constant inter-
cept for GDP growth. The latter estimate is also updated
as new information arrives but weighs all points of the
of the new indicators as soon as sufficient history is available. In the exam-
ple of the PMI, this is the case since mid-2012. By implication, the number
of indicators in our data panel grows when new indicators appear. Full
details about the construction of the vintage database are available in online
appendix E.
sample equally. Figure 3b displays vintages of the median
long-run growth estimate using information available up to
July of each year. The locus traced by the end point of
each vintage corresponds to the current real-time estimate
of figure 3a.
The evolution of the baseline model’s estimate of long-
run growth when estimated in real time declines gradually
from a peak of about 4% in early 2000 to around 2.5% just
after the end of the Great Recession. From this time, the con-
stant estimate shown in figure 3a is always outside the 90%
posterior bands. There is a sharp reassessment of long-run
growth around July 2010, coinciding with the publication
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the annual
revisions to the National Accounts, which each year incor-
porate previously unavailable information for the previous
three years. The revisions implied a substantial downgrade,
in particular, to the growth of consumption in the first year
of the recovery, from 2.5% to 1.6%, and instead allocated
much of the growth in GDP during the recovery to inventory
accumulation.24 Reflecting the role of consumption as the
most persistent and forward-looking component of GDP, the
estimate of long-run growth is downgraded sharply. Figure
3b shows how the 2010 revisions in fact trigger a rein-
terpretation of the years leading to the Great Recession.
With the revised information, the bulk of the slowdown in
long-run growth is now estimated to have occurred before
the recession.25 From 2010 onward, the model predicts a
recovery that is extremely slow by historical standards. This
is four years before the structural break test detected a
statistically significant decline.26 It is evident from the pre-
ceding discussion that revisions to past data by the BEA
are an important source of changes to the long-run growth
estimate in real time. Since the revision process is not mod-
eled explicitly within the DFM, the in-sample results of
section IVC do not take into account the uncertainty stem-
ming from future revisions. Interestingly, in the latest part
of the sample, the estimate of long-run growth has recov-
ered slightly to about 2%, but this has been triggered by
improvements in incoming data rather than revisions to past
vintages.
With regard to the SPF, it is noticeable that from 2003
to about 2010, the survey is remarkably similar to the
model, but since then, the SPF forecast has continued to
drift down only very slowly, standing at 2.5% as of mid-
2015. It is noteworthy that as Stanley Fischer pointed
out in the speech quoted at the start of the paper, dur-
ing that period, both private and institutional forecasters
systematically overestimated growth.
24 See online appendix I for additional figures on the National Accounts
revisions during this period.
25 Indeed, the (one-sided) filtered estimate based on the latest vintage,
which ignores the effect of data revisions, displays a more gradual pattern
of decline (see figure A.1 in section A of the online appendix).
26 A simpler specification that does not use consumption to inform the
trend would detect the decline in long-run growth one year later, with
additional revisions to past GDP in July 2011.
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E. Implications for Nowcasting GDP
The standard DFM with constant long-run growth and
constant volatility has been successfully applied to produce
current quarter nowcasts of GDP (see Banbura et al., 2010,
for a survey). Using our real-time U.S. database, we carefully
evaluate whether the introduction of time-varying long-run
growth and SV into the DFM framework also improves the
performance of the model along this dimension. We find that
over the evaluation window 2000 to 2015, the model is at
least as accurate at point forecasting and significantly better
at density forecasting than the benchmark DFM. Most of the
improvement in density forecasting comes from correctly
assessing the center and the right tail of the distribution,
implying that the time-invariant DFM is assigning excessive
probability to a strong recovery. In an evaluation subsample
spanning the postrecession period, the relative performance
of both point and density forecasts improves substantially,
coinciding with the significant downward revision of the
model’s assessment of long-run growth. In fact, ignoring
the variation in long-run GDP growth would have resulted
in being on average around 1 percentage point too optimistic
from 2009 to 2015.27
To sum up, the addition of the time-varying components
not only provides a tool for decision makers to update their
knowledge about the state of long-run growth in real time.
It also brings about a substantial improvement in short-run
forecasting performance when the trend is shifting, without
worsening the forecasts when the latter is relatively sta-
ble. The proposed model therefore provides a robust and
timely methodology to track GDP when long-run growth is
uncertain.
F. Inspecting the Role of Data Set Size and Composition
The DFM exploits the cross-sectional dimension, and not
just the time series dimension, in separating cycle from trend.
It is interesting to quantify the advantage that the DFM
provides over traditional trend cycle decompositions and to
investigate the robustness of our main conclusions to alter-
native data sets of varying size and composition. In order
to do so, we consider (a) a bivariate model with GDP and
unemployment only (labeled “Okun”), (b) an intermediate
model with GDP and the four additional variables often
included in the construction of coincident indicators (see
Mariano & Murasawa, 2003, and Stock & Watson, 1989)
(labeled “MM03”), (c) our “Baseline” specification with 28
variables, and (d) an “Extended” model that uses disaggre-
gated data for many of the headline series included in the
baseline specification, totaling 155 variables.28 Moreover,
27 Online appendix H provides the full details of the forecast evaluation
exercise.
28 As we argue in section IVA, the introduction of a large number of
disaggregated series, even if related to real activity, is likely to lead to
model misspecification whenever the sectoral data are not contempora-
neously related. For the extended specification, we consider a solution to
this problem that allows maintaining the parsimonious one-factor structure.
in order to investigate the gains associated with imposing
additional structure to long-run GDP growth, for the last
two specifications, we also consider a version of the model
that does not impose common long-run growth in GDP and
consumption.
The top panel of table 2 reports the mean point esti-
mates for each specification over selected subsamples.29 In
all cases, the results are consistent with a decline in the long-
run growth rate in the last part of the sample. Quantitatively,
most specifications are very close to the baseline, with the
specifications that impose common long-run growth in GDP
and consumption finding an earlier and sharper decline. The
exception is the Okun specification, which instead estimates
a smaller increase in the mid-1990s, as well as a larger
decline in long-run growth in the past decade. It is note-
worthy that the mean estimate of the extended specification
is very close to that of the baseline.
The lower portion of table 2 instead investigates the uncer-
tainty around the mean estimates. The uncertainty around
the long-run growth estimate declines as we move from
the bivariate to the multivariate specifications, with most
of the reduction happening once a handful of variables are
included. When the panel is extended to include a large
number of disaggregated series, the uncertainty increases.30
While including a few key series, such as the ones in the
specification of Mariano and Murasawa (2003), seems to
already achieve the bulk of the reduction in uncertainty, it
should be taken into account that those variables are avail-
able only with a relatively long publication lag and subject
to considerable revisions over time. Our proposed strategy
of using an intermediate number of indicators, including the
more timely and accurate surveys, is likely to lead to more
satisfactory results in a real-time setting. Furthermore, the
inclusion of the surveys is helpful in identifying the long-run
growth rate, as those variables do not display a time-varying
long-run mean by construction.
Overall this exercise highlights that the finding of a sub-
stantial decline in the long-run growth rate is confirmed
across different specifications that use data sets of vary-
ing size and composition. The baseline specification, which
uses an intermediate number of series including both hard
data and surveys, leads to the lowest uncertainty around the
By extending the model to include lags of the factor in the observa-
tion equation, each variable can display heterogeneous responses to the
common factor, and correlation between idiosyncratic components is
reduced. Given that the extended model is heavily parameterized, we follow
D’Agostino et al. (2015) in choosing priors that shrink the model toward
the contemporaneous-only specification, which is nested in the extended
case. Full details and the composition of the data set and the changes to the
estimation in case of the extended model are provided in online appendix J.
29 See online appendix J for a comparison of the results of each alternative
specification with the baseline results over the entire sample.
30 We conjecture that as many more variables are added, the fit of the com-
mon factor to the cyclical component of GDP worsens. As a consequence,
some cyclical variation of GDP spills over to the estimate of the long-run
component. The uncertainty around the common factor, on the other hand,
continues to decline.
TRACKING THE SLOWDOWN IN LONG-RUN GDP GROWTH 353
Table 2.—Comparison of Results for Alternative Data Sets and Speciﬁcations
Baseline Extended
Okun MM03 GDP Only GDP + C GDP Only GDP + C
Long-run growth
1947–1972 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.9
1973–1995 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2
1996–2007 2.6 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1
2008–2015 1.6 2.5 2.4 1.8 2.2 1.7
End of sample 1.3 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.0
Uncertainty: Long run
Filtered 0.82 0.63 0.64 0.56 0.78 0.63
Smoothed 0.44 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.44 0.39
Uncertainty: Cycle
Filtered 2.08 1.47 0.79 0.76 0.23 0.23
Smoothed 1.89 1.32 0.62 0.60 0.25 0.25
Each column presents the estimation results corresponding to the alternative models (data sets) considered in this section. The table displays the posterior means of the upper growth rate of real GDP over selected
subsamples and the posterior uncertainty corresponding to both the long-run growth rate of real GDP, as well as the common factor. The uncertainty is calculated as an average over the entire sample. The column in
bold highlights the baseline specification used throughout Section IV.
long-run growth estimate. Our results have important impli-
cations for trend-cycle decompositions of output, which
usually include only a few cyclical indicators, generally
inflation or variables that are direct inputs to the production
function (see, e.g., Gordon, 2014a, or Reifschneider et al.,
2013). As we show, greater precision of the trend component
can be achieved by exploiting the common cyclical features
of additional macroeconomic variables.
V. Decomposing Movements in Long-Run Growth
In this section, we show how our model can be used to
decompose the long-run growth rate of output into long-
run movements in labor productivity and labor input. By
doing this, we exploit the ability of the model to filter away
cyclical variation and idiosyncratic noise and obtain clean
estimates of underlying long-run trends. We see this exercise
as a step toward giving an economically more meaningful
interpretation to the movements in long-run real GDP growth
detected by our model.
GDP growth is by identity the sum of growth in output
per hour and growth in total hours worked. It is therefore
possible to split the long-run growth trend in our model into
two orthogonal components such that this identity is satisfied
in the long run. Here we make use of our flexible definition
of ct in equation (2). In particular, ordering the growth rates
of real GDP, real consumption, and total hours as the first
three variables in yt , we define
at =
[
zt
ht
]
, B =
⎡
⎢⎣
1 1
1 1
0 1
⎤
⎥⎦ , (10)
so that the model is specified with two time-varying compo-
nents, the first of which loads output and consumption but not
hours and the second loads all three series. The first compo-
nent is then by construction the long-run growth rate of labor
productivity, while the second one captures low-frequency
movements in labor input independent of productivity.31
Given the relation in equation (10), the two components add
up to the time-varying intercept in the baseline specification:
gt = zt + ht .32 It follows from standard growth theory that
our estimate of the long-run growth rate of labor productiv-
ity will capture both technological factors and other factors,
such as capital deepening and labor quality.33
Figure 4 presents the results of the decomposition exercise
for the United States. Figure 4a plots the median posterior
estimate of long-run real GDP growth and its labor pro-
ductivity and total hours components. The posterior bands
for long-run real GDP growth are included. The time series
evolution conforms very closely to the narrative of Fernald
(2014), with a pronounced boom in labor productivity in the
mid-1990s and a subsequent fall in the 2000s clearly visible.
The decline in the 2000s is relatively sudden, while the 1970s
slowdown appears as a more gradual phenomenon starting in
the late 1960s. Furthermore, the results reveal that during the
1970s and 1980s, the impact of the productivity slowdown
on output growth was partly masked by a secular increase in
hours, probably reflecting increases in the working-age pop-
ulation as well as labor force participation (see, e.g., Goldin,
2006). Focusing on the period since 2000, labor productiv-
ity accounts for almost the entire decline.34 This contrasts
31 zt and ht jointly follow random walks with diagonal covariance matrix as
defined by equation (7). Restricting the covariance matrix is not necessary
for estimation, but imposing it allows us to interpret the innovations to the
trends as exogenous shocks to the long-run growth rates of the variables.
The hours trend is therefore interpreted as those low-frequency movements
in hours that are uncorrelated with labor productivity. Allowing for a full
covariance matrix would yield trends that are linear combinations of the
current ones, but would lack a clear economic interpretation.
32 Since zt and ht are independent and add up to gt , we set the prior on the
scale of their variances to half of the one set in section IVB on gt .
33 Further decomposing zt into technology and non-technology move-
ments requires additional information to separately identify these compo-
nents. One possibility, which we explore in online appendix K, is to use an
independent measure of TFP to isolate technological factors. Note, how-
ever, that reliable data on capital input, labor quality, or estimates of TFP are
not available in real time, making the focus on long-run labor productivity
more appealing in a real-time setting.
34 In online appendix K, we extend the analysis to decompose the labor
productivity trend into long-run TFP and nontechnological forces. We find
that TFP accounts for virtually all of the slowdown.
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Figure 4.—Decomposition of Long-Run U.S. Output Growth
(a) Posterior Median Estimates of Decomposition
(b) Filtered Estimates of Long-Run Growth Components
(a) The posterior median (solid black line), together with the 68% and 90% (doted and dashed gray
lines) posterior credible intervals of long-run GDP growth and the posterior median of both long-run labor
productivity growth and long-run total hours growth (crossed markers and circled markers). (b) The filtered
estimates of the two components zˆt|t and ˆht|t since 1990. For comparison, the corresponding forecasts from
the SPF are plotted (diamonds and squares). The SPF forecast for total hours is obtained as the difference
between the forecasts for real GDP and labor productivity.
explanations by which slow labor force growth has been a
drag on GDP growth. When taking away the cyclical compo-
nent of hours and focusing solely on its long-run component,
the contribution of hours has, if anything, accelerated since
the Great Recession. Figure 4b presents the filtered estimates
of the two components, that is, the output of the Kalman
filter which uses data only up to each point in time. For
comparison, the corresponding SPF forecasts are included.
Most notably, this plot reveals that starting around 2005,
a relatively sharp revision to labor productivity drives the
decline in long-run output growth.35 Interestingly, the profes-
sional forecasters have been very slow in incorporating the
productivity slowdown into their long-run forecasts. This
35 In an additional figure, provided in section A of the online appendix, we
plot 5,000 draws from the joint posterior distribution of the variances of the
innovations to the labor productivity and hours components. This analysis
confirms the conclusion from the discussion here that changes in labor
productivity, rather than in labor input, are the key driver of low-frequency
movements in real GDP growth.
delay explains their persistent overestimation of GDP growth
since the recession.
It is interesting to compare the results of our decompo-
sition exercise to similar approaches in the literature, in
particular, Gordon (2010, 2014a) and Reifschneider et al.
(2013). Like us, they specify a state-space model with a
common cyclical component and use the output identity to
decompose the long-run growth rate of GDP into underlying
drivers. A key difference resides in the Bayesian estimation
of the model, which enables us to impose a conservative
prior on the variance of the long-run growth component that
helps avoid overfitting the data. Furthermore, the inclusion
of SV in the cyclical component helps to prevent unusually
large cyclical movements from contaminating the long-run
estimate. Another important difference is that we use a larger
amount of information, including key cyclical indicators like
industrial production, sales, and business surveys, which are
generally not included in a production function approach.
This allows us to retrieve a timely and precise estimate of
the cyclical component and, as a consequence, reduce the
uncertainty that is inherent in any trend-cycle decomposi-
tion of the data, as discussed in section IVF. As a result, we
obtain a substantially less pessimistic estimate of the long-
run growth of GDP than these studies in the latest part of
the sample. For instance, Gordon (2014a) reports a long-run
GDP growth estimate below 1% for the end of the sample,
whereas our median estimate stands at around 2%.36
A. International Evidence
To gain an international perspective on our results, we
estimate the DFM for the other G7 economies and perform
the decomposition exercise for each of them.37 The median
posterior estimates of the labor productivity and labor input
trends are displayed in figure 5. Labor productivity, dis-
played in figure 5a, again plays the key role in determining
movements in long-run growth. In the Western European
economies and Japan, the elevated growth rates of labor
productivity prior to the 1970s reflect the rebuilding of the
capital stock from the destruction from World War II and
ended as these economies converged toward U.S. levels of
output per capita. The labor productivity profile of Canada
broadly follows that of the United States, with a slowdown in
the 1970s and a temporary mild boom during the late 1990s.
Interestingly, this acceleration in the 1990s did not occur in
36 The results for a bivariate model of GDP and unemployment, which
we have discussed in section IVF, show that the current long-run growth
estimate is 1.3%, close to Gordon (2014a).
37 Details on the specific data series used for each country are available in
online appendix E. For hours, we again follow the methodology of Ohanian
and Raffo (2012). In the case of the United Kingdom, the quarterly series
for hours displays a drastic change in its stochastic properties in the early
1990s owing to a methodological change in the construction by the ONS, as
confirmed by the ONS LFS manual. We address this issue by using directly
the annual series from the Conference Board’s database, which requires an
appropriate extension of equation (9) to annual variables. To avoid weak
identification of ht for the United Kingdom, we truncate our prior on its
variance to discard values that are larger than twice the maximum posterior
draw of the case of the other countries.
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Figure 5.—Decomposition for Other Advanced Economies
(b) Long-Run Labor Input
(a) Long-Run Labor Productivity
(a) The posterior median of long-run labor productivity across advanced economies. (b) The correspond-
ing estimates of long-run total hours worked. In both panels, “Euro Area” represents a weighted average
of Germany, Italy, and France.
Western Europe and Japan.38 It is interesting to note that the
two countries that experienced a more severe financial crisis,
the United States and the United Kingdom, appear to be the
ones with greatest declines in productivity since the early
2000s, similar to the evidence documented in Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009).
Figure 5b displays the movements in long-run hours
worked identified by equation (10). The contribution of this
component to overall long-run output growth varies con-
siderably across countries. However, within each country,
it is more stable over time than the productivity compo-
nent, which is in line with our findings for the United States.
Indeed, the extracted long-run trend in total hours includes
various potentially offsetting forces that can lead to changes
in long-run output growth. In any case, the results of our
decomposition exercise indicate that after using the DFM
to remove business cycle variation in hours and output, the
decline in long-run GDP growth that has been observed in
38 On the lost decade in Japan, see Hayashi and Prescott (2002). Gordon
(2004) examines the absence of the IT boom in Europe.
the advanced economies since the early 2000s is entirely
accounted for by a decline in the labor productivity trend.
Finally, it is interesting to note that for the countries in the
sample, long-run productivity growth appears to converge in
the cross section, while there is no evidence of convergence
in the long-run growth of hours.
VI. Conclusion
The sluggish recovery from the Great Recession has raised
the question of whether the long-run growth rate of U.S.
real GDP is now lower than it has been on average over
the postwar period. We have presented a dynamic factor
model that allows for changes in both long-run GDP growth
and stochastic volatility. Estimating the model with Bayesian
methods, we provide evidence that long-run growth of U.S.
GDP displays a gradual decline after the turn of the century,
moving from its peak of 3.5% to about 2% in 2015. Using
real-time vintages of data, we demonstrate the model’s abil-
ity to track GDP in a timely and reliable manner. By summer
2010, the model would have concluded that a significant
decline in long-run growth was behind the slow recovery,
therefore substantially improving the real-time tracking of
GDP by explicitly taking into account the uncertainty sur-
rounding long-run growth. Finally, we discuss the drivers
of movements in long-run output growth through the lens
of our model by decomposing it into the long-run growth
rates of labor productivity and labor input. Using data for
both the United States and other advanced economies, our
model points to a global slowdown in labor productivity as
the main driver of weak growth in recent years, extending
the narrative of Fernald (2014) to other economies. Study-
ing the deep causes of the secular decline in growth is an
important priority for future research.
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